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Abstract 
The cases of large corporate scandals such as Enron, WorldCom and Xenox; resulted in to the escalation the scrutiny towards 
the accounting and auditing profession. Due to that, this study is intended to examine the influence of opportunistic behaviour 
and monitoring mechanisms towards EM. Real Earnings Management is a method to stage-manage the financial accounting 
proxy by abnormal cost of goods sold (COGS), abnormal cash flow from operation (CFO) and abnormal discretionary expenses 
(DISEXP). This study employs 2,955 of Shariah-compliant companies for a period of five years from 2009 to 2013. Several 
statistical analyses were carried out to observe the influence of opportunistic behaviour and monitoring mechanisms towards 
EM. Data are drawn from Bursa Malaysia website (annual reports) and Thomson Datastream (financial data). The findings of 
this study revealed that opportunity behaviour and monitoring mechanisms have significant affiliation with EM. The results 
should be of interest to the stakeholders, shareholders and regulatory bodies such as Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) and the 
Securities Commission (SC) to superintend the accountability of corporate financial reporting in the deterrence of EM in 
Shariah-compliant companies. 
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1. Introduction 
The hottest accounting scandal in 2001 involving Enron Corp. has brought the attention of all walks of life. 
The scandal was brought to the limelight of the regulators, academicians, regulators and professionals (Sun & 
Rath, 2009). In Malaysia, the financial scandal surrounding the Port Klang Free Zone (PKFZ) and Perwaja Steel 
have given a signal that all parties have to sit down and have to come out with solutions to overcome this scenario, 
so that, this will not to happen again in future. 
There are many definitions given out by previous researchers; however, the most famous definition is by 
Healy and Wahlen (1999). They defined earnings management “as the act by the managers to alter the financial 
reports with the intention to either mislead readers of those statements or to influence contractual outcomes that 
rely on the accounting numbers reported in the financial statements”. The availability of accounting choices has 
given the managers to manage the company’s earnings. This is the beauty of an accounting. This will create an 
opportunity for the managers to stage-manage the accounting figures of the company in order to suit with their 
own desires. Based on a study done by Davidson III, Jiraporn, Kim & Nemec (2004), they found that the managers 
have the opportunity to manage earnings in order to gain personal benefit such as promotions, rewards or it could 
be to avoid managers’ retrenchment.  
In reality, the companies which have high surplus of free cash flow will give opportunity for the managers to 
engage in earnings manipulation activities (Bukit & Iskandar, 2009). In addition, there is a strong reason for the 
opportunist managers to play their role in a company with high surplus of free cash flow (Bukit & Iskandar, 2009). 
In this situation, the agency problem will arise when there is high surplus of free cash flow in the companies 
(Chung, Firth & Kim, 2005). 
It is very important to monitor the earnings management which involves several mechanisms from external 
monitoring such as institutional investors and the use of high quality auditors (Chung, Firth & Kim, 2005). The 
same goes to the banks in order to reduce earnings management (Ahn & Choi, 2009). The issues surrounding the 
debt covenant violation is the first thing the managers want to avoid and this has triggers them to engage in 
earnings management (Sweeney, 1994; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Dichev and Skinner, 2002; Beatty and 
Weber, 2003). 
This kind of behavior is prohibited in Islam as stipulated in Islam code of conduct. The code of conduct 
emphasises on the accountability, ethics, honesty, integrity, morality and transparency in both business transactions 
and in everyday transactions. In essence, Islam has forbidden the earnings management activities. The Islamic law 
or ‘fiqh’ prescribes the nature of allowable trade and services which generally requires fairness, honesty and justice 
in all business transactions. Any transactions which are unclear, unfair, unjust and fraudulent are explicitly 
forbidden in Islam (Falaika, 2002). 
The issues neighboring the earnings management activities have always been the consideration of all parties 
and it has called the researchers to deeply gain an understanding of what could restrain earnings management 
(Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Therefore, it is important to scrutiny the drivers for the earnings management to 
happen. Additionally, this study outspreads the earnings management literature by comparing the opportunity 
behaviors and monitoring mechanism of Malaysia, particularly on Shariah-compliant companies.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1.  Islamic Capital Market 
 
The Islamic Capital Market (ICM) has positioned itself as an additional option for financial products and 
services available on the international market. Malaysia is very special country as the capital market is distinct 
from the other Asian capital market, where two types of market operates in parallel – the Islamic and conventional. 
According to Securities Commission of Malaysia (SC) in 2013, about 88% of the companies listed on Bursa 
Malaysia Sendirian Berhad (BSMB) are Shariah-compliant companies.  
The ICM is being developed by adopting specific screening processes which are based on various 
considerations. This is the effort initiated by Malaysian government to harmonize and to address the Shariah 
compliance issues for the purpose of promoting and attracting domestic and international investment participation. 
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Among the products introduced by ICM are equity-related products including Shariah-compliant stocks listed on 
Main and ACE Market of BSMB, two shariah indices and equity derivatives such as warrants and transferrable 
subscription rights (TSRs). 
Fundamentally, the Shariah principles will protect the business and investors, consumers and products from 
the unfairness of any untrustworthy and treachery business dealings. Allah S.W.T has put great emphasis for His 
servants to be accountable to Him and that accountability encompasses man’s accountability to his fellow men. 
The following verses in Al-Quran mentioned about the accountability of Muslims as caliph in this world. 
“And fear the Day when you shall be brought back to Allah, then shall every soul be paid for what it has 
earned and none will be dealt with unjustly.” (2:281) 
“To Allah belongs all that is in the heavens and on earth. Whether you show what is in your minds or 
hide it, Allah calls you to account for it.” (2:284) 
Islam also forbids its followers to get involved in fraud and deception and requires transparency in doing business. 
“O you who believe! Stand out firmly for Allah, as witnesses to fair dealing and let not the hatred of 
others to you make you lean towards wrong and depart from justice.” (5:8) 
In addition, Islam also forbids its followers to not involve in any uncertainty (gharar) or interest (riba’) in any 
business transactions. Islam has forbidden all forms of riba’ since it involves oppression and exploitation as stated 
in Al-Quran. 
 “…they say: trade is like riba’, but Allah has permitted trading and forbidden (haram) riba’ (ursury)” 
(Al-Baqarah: 275-281), while in another verse, “O you believe! Eat not your property among yourselves 
unjustly except in a trade amongst you by mutual consent” (An-Nisa’: 29). 
Allah S.W.T. has said in the Al-Quran about the concept of riba’ and consequences of riba’ which includes, 
 “In the hereafter, they shall be raised by Allah like those who have been driven to madness by the touch 
of the devil (Al-Baqarah: 275)” 
While according to the Hadith reported by Muslim has mentioned, 
 “A dirham of riba’ which a man receives knowingly is worse than committing adultery 36 times”. 
It is expected that with the introduction of Shariah code of conduct, there will be a significant positive 
improvement in the business developments around the world. It is due to the introduction of a proper and 
appropriate behavioural conduct code for Muslims, the sense of responsibility and cautions by the management 
should increase due to religiously enthused investments. Such positivity could be explained by the argument 
explained by Durant (1950) and Schelling (1968) that the basis for civilized behaviour could impact changes in 
accountability and moral behaviour. 
2.2. Shariah-Compliant Companies 
Shariah law is apprehensive with the moral and ethical value of commercial transactions. For the companies 
to make the grade to be a shariah-compliant company, the company has to prove that they are not involved in any 
uncertainty (gharar) or interest (riba’) activities as they run their main business activity. The business must comply 
with the Shariah code of conduct. The screening process will be taken place in order to regulate the status of the 
company. 
As to date, there are no standardized methods for the screening process. In Malaysia, the Shariah Advisory 
Council (SAC) of Securities Commission (SC) is adopting the Dow Jones-RHB Islamic Malaysia Index and FTSE 
Global Islamic Index Series as part of their screening process. According to Ali (2008), based on the research and 
advice from Shariah scholars, the index provides screen stocks for Shariah compliance and publishes information 
about equities that Muslims can trade in without breaching the requirement of Islamic principles. 
A detailed compliance by the Shariah-compliant companies towards Shariah law is authoritative, since 
Muslim investors would show interest to invest when such compliance is warranted. Based on a study done by 
Faishal, Eng and Ali (2009), Southeast Asia had the highest potential in attracting Shariah compliant real estate 
investment. It is because they found that 95% of their respondents favor Shariah-compliant companies that are in 
full compliance with “halal” type of business structure. As such, ICM is the stepping stone for Malaysia to 
enhance its economic activities. However, extensive measures are needed to ensure that Shariah law is not 
unkempt. 
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2.3. Earnings Management 
 
 Earnings management is an act done by the managers to manipulate the financial statements, so that; they 
will present the utmost net profit for the company. The definition of earnings management may differ and be 
subjected to the instruments of manipulation, the purpose of the earnings management behavior and its timing. 
Although the meaning of EM was defined in a variety of ways, the previous literature on the definition of EM 
generally agrees that the engagement of the managers in the EM activities is to alter the financial statements in 
order to mislead the financial users. Explicitly, the motives behind EM can lie between better compensation 
package, job security, career advancement, to reduce regulatory costs, to prevent violations of loan contract and to 
enhance any foreseeable benefits in relation to the business and management.  
 
 A good definition of EM is from Healy and Wahlen (1999). They stated the following: 
 
 “Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic 
performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers.” (Healy & Wahlen, 1999, p.368) 
 
 From the definition, it can be said that EM is an intentional act and the managers realize their actions 
taken to manipulate the accounting numbers. This is done to portray an idea that the financial statements of the 
company are in good position (Mohd Taufik et al., 2015). 
 
 There are two types of EM, namely, accrual earnings management (AEM) and real earnings management 
(REM). AEM involves the General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) choices that try to obscure or mask 
the true economic performance (Dechow & Skinner, 2000). On the other hand, REM occurs when managers 
undertake actions that deviate from the first best practice to upsurge the reported earnings.  
 After the Enron scandal in 2001, the managers were shifting from AEM activities to REM activities 
(Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). It is said that the actions taken by the mangers in engaging in REM activities will 
unlikely to be detected by the auditors. REM is more costly and hazardous compare to AEM as it involves cash 
flow consequences (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). Furthermore, REM will be likely to impose a 
negative impact on future performance (Gunny, 2010). 
 Malaysia is a developing country which has the vision to become one of the developed countries by 
2020. According to the Securities Commission of Malaysia (SC) in its quarterly news bulletin released on 
October 2009, Malaysia has continued to receive positive reports on its corporate governance framework, 
particularly for its investor protection regime. As stated in the bulletin, based on the World Bank’s Doing 
Business 2010 Report, Malaysia has retained its position at fourth place for investor protection for four 
consecutive years. Some of the dimensions covered in the investor protection were the transparency of 
transactions, the extent of directors’ liability for self-dealing, and the ease of shareholders’ suits. Studies done 
by Bhojraj et al. (2009) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010) concluded that REM is implemented in countries with 
strong investor protection. Due to that reason, this study will use REM activities as proxies for EM. 
2.3. Hypotheses Development 
The risk of financial distress could be a reason why EM prospers. The managers can assume to have their 
bonuses cut, be replaced and suffer loss of reputation if a firm is in financial distress (Liberty and Zimmerman, 
1986; Gilson, 1989). Thus, as it is recommended by conventional wisdoms, the managers have the incentives to 
obscure such a deteriorating performance by resorting to accounting choices that increase income.  
 
The opportunist managers may attempt to miss out some of the preparation of the projected cash flow and 
profit forecast. They took a wrong decision in investing company’s cash flow which could negatively affect the 
company’s future earnings. The managers may discretely increase the reported earnings by employing accounting 
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numbers. Therefore, the first hypothesis is: 
 
H1: Opportunistic behaviours are positively related to earnings management. 
 
According to Jensen (1986), when the debt financing took place in a company, the lender will monitor the 
company’s activities and the management spending is restricted subject to the lender prescription. This is to 
guarantee the company to commit with the debt repayment and the commitment will decrease the company’s cash 
and consequently can dodge the management to misuse the cash (Jensen 1986; Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchell 
1993; Stulz 1990). The debt commitment should be taken seriously by the company as they have to use the free 
cash flow to pay their debt and that means less cash left for management to spend. The monitoring activities by the 
lenders have showed to increase in the value of shareholders’ wealth resulting from reduction in managerial 
discretion on investment decision and leveraged recapitalizations firms. 
 
According to Ling et al. (2007), leverage will lessen the cash available in the company; thus, reducing the 
likeliness of earnings management to happen. As an institutional investor, they can act as a strong mechanism to 
force the management to pay out dividends but if they pay high dividend it may reduce the cash available for the 
debt repayment later on (Li & Huang, 2007; Zulfiqar, 2010). The type of auditor, on the other hand is going to 
restrain the managers to engage in EM (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999). Hence, based on the above 
arguments, the second hypothesis developed is as follow: 
 
H2: Monitoring mechanisms is negatively related to earnings management. 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Sample selection 
 
The sample selection for this study was taken from Bursa Malaysia Sendirian Berhad (BSMB) and Data 
Stream Thomson Reuters. It covers the Shariah-compliant companies listed in the Securities Commission (SC) for 
the year 2009 that are continuously listed until 2013.  A total of 694 of Shariah-compliant companies for 5-years 
were identified for the analysis, making up for the secondary data entailing of financial statements constituent.  
 
3.2. Dependent Variables and Measurement 
3.2.1. Earnings Management 
 
 Previous researches have discussed on the influence of EM towards the companies in many ways such as 
the performance of the companies, its effect towards the economics of the country and the reasons for the arising 
of EM. Rather than using the accrual-based measures as a proxy for EM, this study employs real-based measures 
as a proxy for EM. According to Gunny (2005), there are four types of Rem, namely, myopically investing in 
research and development to increase income; myopically investing in selling and distribution, administrative and 
finance expense; timing of income recognition from the disposal of long-lived assets; and investments and cutting 
prices to boost sales in the current period and/or overproducing to shrink cost of goods sold (COGS) expense. 
 REM is a very good method in such a way it can affect earnings so as to achieve a specific reported 
earnings objective (Scott, 2011). The managers are also willing to sacrifice the future cash flows for current period 
income (Cohen & Zarowin, 2010). Based on a study done by Bruns and Merchant (1990) and Graham et al. 
(2005), financial executives indicate that there is a greater willingness to manipulate earnings through real 
activities than accrual.   
 This study employs the methods of REM by Roychowdhury (2006) as a proxy for EM. It focuses on the 
abnormal cost of goods sold (COGS), abnormal cash flow from operations (CFO) and abnormal discretionary 
expenses (DISEXP). Below are the equations for EM: 
 
(A) The normal level of Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) 
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                          COGSt / At-1 = α0 + α1 (1 / At-1) + β1 (St / At-1) + εt    (1) 
 
Where: COGSt      = Cost of goods sold (current year) 
 At-1               = Total assets (previous year) 
 St               = Sales (current year) 
  εt                         = Residual value 
 
 
(B) The normal level of Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) 
CFOt / At-1 = α0 + α1 (1 / At-1) + β1 (St / At-1) + β2 (ΔSt / At-1) + εt                 (2) 
 
Where: CFOt = Cash flow from operations (current year) 
 At-1               = Total assets (previous year) 
 St               = Sales (current year) 
 ΔSt  = Change in sales (current year) 
  εt                          = Residual value 
 
 
(C) The normal level of Discretionary Expenses (DISEXP) 
   DISEXPt / At-1 = α0 + α1 (1 / At-1) + β1 (St-1 / At-1) + εt    (3) 
 
Where: DISEXPt    = Discretionary expenses (current year) 
 At-1                 = Total assets (previous year) 
 St-1                 = Sales (previous year) 
  εt                           = Residual value 
 
 All the equations above are based on Roychowdhury (2006). It is said to have a residual value if the actual 
amount of COGS, CFO and DISEXP are varied from the normal intensity. The suspected firms are those firms 
with the residual values based on linear regression. Based on linear regression, the number of suspected firms for 
Abnormal COGS is 2,885 firms; Abnormal CFO is 2,836 firms; and Abnormal DISEXP is 2,313. A total of 8,034 
firms were suspected to be engaged in earnings manipulation activities throughout 5 years from 2009 to 2013. This 
meant that some of the firms were engaging in more than one REM activities. However, further analyses were 
carried out to determine the relationship between independent variables and dependent variables. The number of 
sample for each model has been reduced by excluding the outliers. Below is the breakdown of number of sample 
for each model: 
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 Table 1: Final sample of suspected firms for each model 
 
Initial sample 823   
(-) Non-shariah compliant companies (129)   
Shariah-compliant companies 694   
(-) FIA 2013 (29)   
(-) Unavailability of data (74)   
Final sample for each year 591   
    
Final sample for 5 years (2009 – 2013) 2,955 
 
 COGS CFO DISEXP 
(-) Outliers (356) (341) (874) 
Final sample of suspected companies 2,599 2,614 2,081 
    
 
 
3.3. Measurement of Independent Variables 
 
3.3.1. Risk of Financial Distress 
 
 In order to measure the risk of financial distress of the companies, this study employed the Z-score by 
Altman (1968). This model can be used as a tool to learn and predict the financial health of the company (Oluwo, 
2007). The formula for the calculation is: 
 
(4) 
                     Where: 
  Z      = Overall classification index 
  x(1)  = Working capital over total assets 
  x(2)  = Retained earnings over total assets 
  x(3)  = Earnings before interest and taxes over total assets 
  x(4)  = Market value of equity over book value of total debt 
 
3.3.2. Profitability 
 
 The formula for profitability is the operating income divided by cash-adjusted total assets (i.e., total assets 
minus cash and cash equivalents). The calculation is based on a study done by Lie and Li (2005) which has used 
return on asset (ROAt) as a proxy for profitability. This study is using ROAt which is the return on asset for the 
current year as it is better matched which produce less misspecified tests (Kothari et al., 2005). 
 
3.3.3. Leverage 
 
 It is believed that the company facing a financial problem will tend to practice EM. Thus, it is important 
to scrutiny the financial risk. The measurement for the leverage is the total debt divided by total assets. This 
followed the study done by Li and Lin (2005). It is said that the companies which incurred highly leverage or loss 
would have greater incentives and possibility to be involved in EM (Choi et al. 2010).  
3.3.4. Type of Auditor 
 When a company hired a big firm to audit their financial reports, it is likely that the company will be less 
likely to engage in EM (Becker et al, 1998; Francis et al, 1999; Gore et al., 2001). However, there is an argument 
Z = 1.2x(1) + 1.4x(2) +3.3x(3) + 0.6x(4) + 1.0x(5)    
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that there will be EM activities in the company when the big audit firm is hired (Libby and Kinney, 2000). For that 
reason, dummy variable was included in this study; ‘1’ which is denoted if the company was hiring Big 4 audit 
firm while ‘0’ is denoted if the company was hiring non-Big 4 audit firm. 
 
3.4. Measurement of Control Variables 
 
  This study uses two control variables which are firm size and return on total asset. Due to the significant 
relationship between firm size and EM, the firm size was measured as log total assets.  The measurement followed 
the study done by Dechow and Dichev (2004); Eldenburg et al. (2007); and Jelinek (2007). On the other hand, 
there is a negative relationship between return on total asset (ROTA) and EM. The measurement for ROTA is 
earnings before interest and tax divided by total assets. This measure is commonly used in accounting literature 
(Gunny, 2005). According to Gunny (2005), all four types of REM activities in the study were incrementally 
informative about future earnings and cash flow. The negative relationship between ROTA and EM is an 
indication that the company is using its assets to generate earnings before contractual obligations must be paid. 
 
Hence, the estimation model is: 
 
REM = Altman Z-score + Profitability + Leverage + Type of Auditor + Firm size + Return on Total Asset 
 
Below are the estimation models for each activity: 
 
(a) COGS = Altman Z-score + Profitability + Leverage + Type of Auditor + Firm size + Return on Total Asset 
(b) CFO = Altman Z-score + Profitability + Leverage + Type of Auditor + Firm size + Return on Total Asset 
(c) DISEXP = Altman Z-score + Profitability + Leverage + Type of Auditor + Firm size + Return on Total Asset 
 
 
 
                Figure 3.1: The Conceptual Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Findings 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Opportunistic Behaviour 
Risk of Financial Distress 
Profitability 
 
Monitoring Mechanisms 
Leverage 
Type of Auditor 
 
Independent Variable (IV) 
Firm Size 
Return on Total Asset 
 
Control Variable (CV) 
Earnings Management  
Abnormal Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) 
Abnormal Cash Flow from Operation (CFO) 
Abnormal Discretionary Expenses (DISEXP) 
 
Dependent Variable (DV) 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistic for Abnormal COGS 
  Mean Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Residual 0.4303 0 1.72 0.19543 1.501 5.581 
ZSCORE 1.1526 -11.1913 6.0768 0.9231 -1.026 15.293 
PROFIT 5.4921 .0000 7.9407 0.7767 -1.706 14.366 
LEV 0.1789 .0000 7.7322 0.2367 13.545 40.089 
AUD 0.49 0 1 0.5 0.47 -1.999 
SLOGTA 5.5536 .00 7.95 0.64655 0.218 4.742 
ROTA 0.0607 -.6304 0.9852 0.0971 1.058 12.347 
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics of abnormal COGS for a sample of 2,599. 
The abbreviations of: Residual represent Abnormal COGS, ZSCORE represent Risk of 
financial distress, PROFIT represent profitability, LEV represent Leverage, AUD represent 
type of auditor, SIZE represent firm size and ROTA represent return on total asset. 
Table 3: Descriptive statistic for Abnormal CFO 
  Mean Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Residual .8199 .02 2.78 .3817 .984 2.714 
ZSCORE 1.1667 -5.1690 6.4920 .8954 -.020 3.752 
PROFIT 5.4027 .0000 7.9407 1.0372      -2.836 14.074 
LEV .1894 .0000 7.7322 .2942 11.511 23.4464 
AUD .49 0 1 .500 .037 -2.000 
LOGTA 5.5266 .0000 7.9468 .7390 -1.520 14.743 
ROTA .0648 -1.1926 1.8341 .1391 3.632 47.453 
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics of abnormal CFO for a sample of 2,614. 
The abbreviations of: Residual represent Abnormal COGS, ZSCORE represent Risk of 
financial distress, PROFIT represent profitability, LEV represent Leverage, AUD represent 
type of auditor, SIZE represent firm size and ROTA represent return on total asset. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistic for Abnormal DISEXP 
  Mean Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Residual .6809 .03 2.21 .3514 .536 .733 
ZSCORE 1.1581 -4.8099 4.8758 .8591 -.035 2.856 
PROFIT 5.3583 .0000 7.8684 1.1026 -2.877 12.877 
LEV .1744 .0000 1.6415 .1952 2.440 11.156 
AUD .49 0 1 .500 .034 -2.001 
LOGTA 5.4296 .0000 7.8726 .9834 -2.919 15.677 
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ROTA .0502 -1.1926 1.8341 .1150 1.650 47.248 
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics of abnormal COGS for a sample of 2,081. 
The abbreviations of: Residual represent Abnormal COGS, ZSCORE represent Risk of 
financial distress, PROFIT represent profitability, LEV represent Leverage, AUD represent 
type of auditor, LOGTA represent firm size and ROTA represent return on total asset. 
Table 2, 3 and 4 present the minimum, maximum, mean, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis for 
the variables used in the current study. The first row in table shows earnings management (EM) with abnormal 
COGS, abnormal CFO and abnormal DISEXP as used by Roychowdhury (2006).  
Overall, most of the variables had positive skewness and kurtosis, indicating that most of the data were 
distributed at positive values and clustered in the centre. Based on the information provided, this indicated that the 
data was close to normal distribution and it is suggested that there was no violation of assumption of normality.  
4.2 Multicollinearity Test 
                                 Table 5: Multicollinearity Test for All Three Models 
  COGS CFO DISEXP 
  Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF 
ZSCORE .883 1.132 .914 1.094 .833 1.200 
PROFIT .251 3.991 .422 2.370 .175 5.708 
LEV .963 1.038 .905 1.106 .923 1.084 
AUD .995 1.005 .994 1.006 .992 1.008 
LOGTA .247 4.048 .419 2.370 .174 5.747 
ROTA .866 1.155 .851 1.175 .835 1.198 
 According to the above table, the values of tolerance for all variables for each model was more than 0.1 
which means the multicollinearity assumption was not violated. Conversely, VIF results were between 1.005 to 
5.747 which is below the ceiling value of 10. Thus, all variables used in this study were correlated among them 
and did not create multicollinearity problems. 
4.2 Pearson’s Correlation Product Moment  
Table 6, 7 and 8 below illustrate the relationship between the dependent variables and the independent 
variables. All models have a positive correlation with risk of financial distress of the firm at 5%. The findings, 
suggests that companies with a high risk of financial distress would face higher chances of bankruptcy and are 
more likely to manage earnings. 
Table 6: Pearson’ Correlation for Abnormal COGS 
Variables Residual  Zscore PROFIT LEV AUD SIZE ROTA 
Residual 1 .358* -.074* .016* .010** -.063* .537 
Zscore  1 -.029* -.115 -.020* -.020* .304 
PROFIT   1 .011** .065 .865 .084 
LEV    1 .031* .077 .099 
AUD     1 -.045* .015* 
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LOGTA      1 .141 
ROTA       1 
     *Correlation is significant at 0.05 levels (2- tailed) 
       **Correlation is significant at 0.01 levels (2 – tailed) 
 
Table 7: Pearson’s Correlation for Abnormal CFO 
Variables Residual  Zscore PROFIT LEV AUD SIZE ROTA 
Residual 1 .455* -.100* .128 .050* -.068* .343 
Zscore  1 -.010* -.093 -.015* .004** .245 
PROFIT   1 .011* -.069 .758 .019* 
LEV    1 .029* .057 .259 
AUD     1 -.049* .006** 
LOGTA      1 .092 
ROTA       1 
     *Correlation is significant at 0.05 levels (2- tailed) 
       **Correlation is significant at 0.01 levels (2 – tailed) 
 
Table 8: Pearson’s Correlation for Abnormal DISEXP 
Variables Residual  Zscore PROFIT LEV AUD SIZE ROTA 
Residual 1 .442* -.104* .137 .046* -.096* .253 
Zscore  1 .005** -.166 -.022* 0.22* .350 
PROFIT   1 .130 -.068 .908 .111 
LEV    1 .036* .140 .116 
AUD     1 -.062 .023* 
LOGTA      1 .133 
ROTA       1 
     *Correlation is significant at 0.05 levels (2- tailed) 
       **Correlation is significant at 0.01 levels (2 – tailed) 
 
All three models, shows a significant correlation between profitability and EM at 5%. The result shows 
that the probability of managers to engage in earnings management is high if the company holds undue cash flow 
(free cash flow). Ordinarily, in this situation the manager would incline to invest in the non-value investment and 
misuse the fund for personal gain. The finding for all models also indicates that the higher the leverage of the firm, 
the higher the probability of earnings management being practiced in the firm. In other words, the manager in the 
firm with high leverage would have higher intention to engage in earnings management in order to avoid the debt 
covenant violations. However, only abnormal COGS is significant with r=0.016, p <0.05. From the findings 
mentioned above it can be deduced that that a large firm are likely to take up more loan, of which high leverage 
could increase the chances of being in financial distress; and have more free cash flow thus managers are more 
likely to manage earnings. 
The type of auditors also demonstrated the positive relationship with EM. It shows that when the 
company is hiring a reputable big-4 audit firms, there will be a higher chance for the managers to manage 
earnings. The size of the firm also shows significant correlation with earnings management for all three models at 
5%. On the other hand, the return on total assets (ROTA) has insignificant positive correlation with EM.  
4.3 Regression Analysis 
4.3.1 Regression Analysis of Pooled Data 
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 The regression results are presented in Table 9 for the pooled data to test for the first and second 
hypotheses respectively.   
                         Table 9: The Regression Results of Each REM Activity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 With reference to Table 9 above, it shows that all accounted variables would influence for the earnings 
management practices. The table shows a significant relationship between risk of financial distress and earnings 
management. The findings support earlier studies by Spathis (2002) and Barsky et al. (2003). Due to high risk of 
financial distress, companies would be more prone to engage in earnings manipulation, as managers would want to 
reduce the risk of bankruptcy by showing favourable earnings in the financial report.  
However, the relationship between the profitability and earnings management is negatively significant, 
only for abnormal CFO. The result suggests that low level of profitability would increase the risk of earnings 
manipulation, inconsistent with the findings of Gul (2001), Chung et al. (2005) and Bukit and Iskandar (2009). For 
instance, the managers could manage the earnings so that the free cash flow is in balance with the total assets.  
Thus, hypothesis 1 is partially accepted.  
Looking at the affiliation between leverage and earnings management, there is a positive association, but 
only significant for model abnormal CFO and abnormal DISEXP. To ensure debt covenants are not violated, 
managers would be motivated to understate liabilities or overstate assets if the company did not have the ability to 
obtain extra capital through borrowing. Thus, being in a state of indebtedness levy a higher possibility for a 
company to achieve their earnings. The type of auditor is positively affiliated with all three models; however, only 
abnormal CFO is significant. This totally rejects Hypothesis 2 as previous studies found a negative relationship 
between types of auditor with EM. Nevertheless, there is a study that can support this result. A study by Libby and 
Kinney (2000) found that a big audit firm will allow EM activities to occur in the company. Hence, hypothesis 2 is 
rejected.  
Notably, the log total asset (proxy for firm size), shows a significant result towards earnings management.  
However, it was found that firm size in this study is negatively associated with earnings management for all three 
 COGS CFO DISEXP 
Variables 
(Constant) .534*** .789*** .652*** 
Zscore .044*** .175*** .185*** 
PROFIT .002 -.024** -.017 
LEV .001 .144*** .399*** 
AUDIT .001 .034*** .025 
LOGTA -0.04*** -.023 -.035 
ROTA 0.99*** .600*** .266*** 
R Square .346 .288 .269 
Adjusted  R Square .344 .286 .266 
F statistics 228.444*** 175.755*** 126.952*** 
 Note: This table shows the model summary of each REM activity. 
 R-square is the regression coefficient determination. 
 Adjusted R-square is the adjusted regression coefficient determination. 
 F-statistics is the indication on how much variation is explained by the regression equation. 
Zscore is a proxy for risk of risk of financial distress; PROFIT is measured by total assets minus cash and cash 
equivalents; LEV is measured by total debts deflated by total assets; AUDIT is measured by denoting ‘1’ if 
auditor is BIG4 and ‘0’ is otherwise; LOGTA is a proxy for size; ROTA is measured by earnings before interest 
and tax divided by total assets. 
***Significant at the 0.001 level (Sig 2 - tailed) 
** Significant at the 0.01 (Sig 2 –tailed)  
* Significant at 0.05 level (Sig 2 – tailed) 
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models, but, only abnormal COGS was found to be significant. The finding is inconsistent with earlier study by 
Short and Keasey (1999), as their findings shows that the firm size had a positive significant effect on EM. The 
result in this study give different signal as the common assumption is that a large firm size gives the managers 
more opportunities to manage earnings. As for return on total assets, all three models give a significant positive 
relationship with EM. It shows that the higher return on total assets will exhibit higher EM manipulation activities. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 Through empirical study using the Shariah-compliant companies listed in Bursa Malaysia Sendirian 
Berhad (BSMB) from 2009 to 2013, the following conclusions were drawn for this study. This study adopted the 
methods by Roychowdhury (2006) as proxies for EM. This study was basically carried out to determine the impact 
of opportunistic behaviors (risk of financial distress and profitability) and monitoring mechanisms (leverage and 
type of auditor) towards EM.  
 The results obtained from this study reveals that EM does occur in Malaysian Shariah-approved 
companies. All three models showed the significant positive relationship between risks of financial distress with 
EM. Companies would be more prone to engage in earnings manipulation, as managers would want to reduce the 
risk of bankruptcy by showing favourable earnings in the financial report. However, the relationship between the 
profitability and earnings management is negatively significant, and only for abnormal CFO. Based on these 
result, Hypothesis 1 is partially accepted. 
Looking at the affiliation between leverage and earnings management, there is a positive association, but 
significant only for abnormal CFO and abnormal DISEXP. To ensure debt covenants are not violated, managers 
would be motivated to understate liabilities or overstate assets if the company did not have the ability to obtain 
extra capital through borrowing. The type of auditor is positively affiliated with all three models; however, only 
abnormal CFO is significant which is inconsistent with previous studies. Nevertheless, there is a study that can 
support this result. A study by Libby and Kinney (2000) found that a big audit firm will allow EM activities to 
occur in the company. Hence, Hypothesis 2 is totally rejected.  
 There were some limitations during the implementation of this research which give initiatives for future 
research. The sample used in this study for a period of five years is considered as moderate compared to previous 
studies. Future research may consider longer time frame with the resulting impact also considers the other 
regulations related such as corporate governance, earnings management and Shariah-approved companies. A 
comparative study could be piloted to determine the impact of pre and post regulation periods associated to 
corporate governance and earnings management.  Other than that, the sample could be extended to all public listed 
companies in Bursa Malaysia Sendirian Berhad (BSMB), thereby providing a comparison with Shariah-approved 
companies. Moreover, the study of Shariah-compliant companies could be prolonged to other Islamic countries 
other than Malaysia. Future study also can focus on the type of industry and year as independent variables in order 
to see whether these two components have significant impact on EM. 
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